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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The equal protection clauses of both the Utah and the 
United States Constitutions protect against discrimination among 
individuals who are similarly situated. Mothers and fathers who 
have been properly adjudicated as such are similarly situated. 
Both are equally responsible for their children and are therefore 
entitled to similar treatment. Utah Code Section 75-2-109 (1) (b) 
treats mothers and fathers differently by requiring fathers to 
meet requirements which are not also imposed upon mothers. The 
statute is therefore unconstitutional. 
The gender-based discrimination created by the subject 
statute can only be upheld when it serves important governmental 
objectives and is substantially related to those objectives. The 
subject statute does not provide for a fair and efficient system 
of property disposition, nor does it ensure that only a 
"nurturing" parent will inherit through its deceased child. The 
discrimination created by the subject statute therefore, cannot 
be upheld. 
The requirements which the subject statute places upon 
fathers are unconstitutionally vague and in violation of Due 
Process. Not only are fathers "uncertain as to what is 
prohibited", but judges and jurors are also "free to determine" 
the meaning of those requirements. 
Although all legislative enactments are presumed 
constitutional, this Court has an imperative duty to strike down 
unconstitutional provisions. The unconstitutional provisions of 
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the subject statute are evident and should therefore be stricken. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
SECTION 75-2-109(1) (b) OF THE UTAH CODE PROVIDES 
DISSIMILAR TREATMENT FOR MALES AND FEMALES WHO ARE SIMILARLY 
SITUATED AMD VIOLATES ARTICLE 4, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-109 (1) (b) ("the subject 
statute") gives mothers a right to inherit through their children 
automatically, simply because the mother is the mother of the 
child. A father, on the other hand, must not only prove that he 
is the father, but he must meet additional requirements which are 
not imposed upon the mother. The subject statute thereby 
presumes fathers are "undeserving", and "categorically 
eliminates" them from an inheritance through their children. See 
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 368 (1979); (White, J., 
dissenting). The Constitutional defect with the subject statute 
is therefore that only a father and not a mother must meet 
specific requirements in order to inherit through his child. 
A. ONCE PATERNITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, BOTH PARENTS 
BECOME RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR CHILD AND ARE THEREFORE SIMILARLY 
SITUATED. 
The Supreme Court of Florida has said: "...there can be no 
discrimination between the parents based upon sex since both are 
equal in the eves of the law." (Emphasis added). Yorden v. 
Savage, 279 S.2d 844 (Fla. 1973). And the Supreme Court of the 
United States has said: "...maternal and paternal roles are not 
invariably different in importance." Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 
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380, at 388 (1979). Mothers and fathers are therefore equally 
responsible for their children. 
This fact is evidenced by the existence of paternity suits 
and the requirement of child support payments. Respondent would 
have us believe that a mother becomes "automatically responsible" 
for a child when she becomes pregnant, and that a father "is not 
automatically responsible" for the child. (See Brief of 
Respondent, pg. 5). Although the mother's pregnancy may force 
some responsibility upon her, a paternity adjudication has the 
same effect upon the father. This means that once a father's 
paternity has been established, he bears the same rights and 
responsibilities as the mother. In other words, absent a 
termination of a parent's right and duty, both are equally 
responsible for their children, (See 59 Am Jur 2d, Parent and 
Child §22) , and both are therefore similarly situated with 
respect to their children. 
The appellant, Michael Pessetto, was properly adjudicated 
to be the father of William "Billy Joe" Scheller, and subsequent 
to this finding did make child support payments. (See transcript 
of proceedings of October 16, 1987, pages 1 and 2, Case No. 
16434; and Findings of Fact, November 3, 1987, paragraphs 4 and 
5). Once this paternity was established therefore, the Appellant 
became responsible for his child. It was at this time that the 
Appellant, as the father, became similarly situated with the 
Respondent as the mother. It follows then, that both the 
Appellant and the Respondent, as parents of the child, are 
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entitled under Article IV, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution to 
similar treatment. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 62 (Utah 1984). 
The Respondent relies heavily upon the United States 
Supreme Court Opinion in the Parham case. In that case the 
United States Supreme Court held that mothers and fathers of 
illegitimate children are not similarly situated. The Court's 
use of "illegitimate" indicates that its focus was on the fact 
that the child hadn't been legitimized. It is likely that had 
the father in Parham legitimized his child, the Court would have 
allowed his action. In the present case, unlike Parham, the 
Appellant was adjudicated as the father of the child, and the 
child then became legitimized. Parham is therefore inapplicable 
since it dealt with mothers and fathers of illegitimate children. 
The Respondent's reliance upon Parham is misplaced due to the 
distinction between the parents of "illegitimate" children and 
the parents of "legitimate" children. 
Based upon their equal duties and responsibilities, 
mothers and fathers of legitimate children are similarly 
situated. The Appellant's paternity has been established and he 
is therefore similarly situated with the Respondent. The subject 
statute has the effect, of denying the Appellant inheritance 
through his child solely because he is the father of the child. 
It is indisputable that, in this case, had both parents abandoned 
the child after Defendant's paternity was established, Respondent 
would be entitled to inherit and Appellant, pursuant to the trial 
court's decisiou, would not. 
8 
B. THE FACT THAT SIMILAR GENDER-BASED LEGISLATION OF 
OTHER STATES HAS NEVER BEEN DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL DOES NOT 
MAKE THE SUBJECT STATUTE CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The idea that the subject statute, as it has been adopted 
by other states, has never been declared unconstitutional, (See 
Brief of Respondent, page 10), does not make the subject statute 
constitutional. The fact that a statute has been construed and 
applied for a considerable period of time does not necessarily 
render it free from constitutional attack: and acquiescence over 
a period of many years will not render an unconstitutional 
statute valid. See 16 Am Jur. 2d. Constitutional Law, §229. 
Although the subject statute as it exists in other states 
has not been held unconstitutional, it has been interpreted very 
liberally. In Matter of Estate of Spencer, cited by the 
Respondent, the Michigan Court of Appeals said: 
...[W]e do not believe that the Legislature 
intended to require a distinct kind of relationship 
in order for a child coming within the preview of 
this provision to inherit, rather we believe that 
the Legislature's concern was to insure that a 
biological relationship of parent and child did 
indeed exist. Accordingly, we believe that the 
statute requires a mutually acknowledged biological 
relationship of parent and child. ...We do not 
believe that this statute should be construed to 
require an ongoing social relationship .... 
Matter of Estate of Spencer, 383 NW 2d 266 at 268 (Mich. 1985) . 
And the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine stated: 
The father of a child born out of wedlock has 
the right to inherit from the child if the father 
acknowledges paternity before a justice bf the 
peace or a notary.... It is now clear that unwed 
fathers have important interests in their offspring 
that are entitled to constitutional protection. 
Johannesen v. Pfeiffer, 387 A.2d 1113 at 1114 (Me. 1978). 
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The mere fact that the subject statute has never before 
been declared unconstitutional does not make it constitutional. 
Indeed, the cases dealing with the subject statute as it has been 
enacted in other states indicate that it has been interpreted 
liberally in order to avoid any constitutional difficulty. The 
subject statute cannot therefore escape judicial scrutiny in this 
case merely because it has never before been declared 
unconstitutional. 
II 
ALTHOUGH THE STATE HAS A CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE 
MAINTENANCE OF A FAIR AND EFFICIENT METHOD OF INTESTATE 
SUCCESSION, THE SUBJECT STATUTE DOES NOT SERVE THIS OBJECTIVE. 
A statute which discriminates upon the basis of gender 
"must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives in order 
to withstand judicial scrutiny under the equal protection 
clause". Caban 441 U.S. at 387. The subject statute as it is 
written does not serve any of these "important governmental 
objectives" and cannot therefore withstand judicial scrutiny. 
The Respondent argues that the subject statute provides: 
(1) an accurate, fair and efficient system for the disposition of 
property at death, and (2) that an inheritance from an 
illegitimate child goes to a parent who has participated actively 
in the nurturing of the child and that a parent who has taken no 
active role in the birth or rearing of a child is prevented from 
reaping a financial windfall. See Brief of Respondent, pages 11 
and 12. Contrary to the Respondent's argument, the subject 
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statute does not provide for "fair" treatment of unwed mothers 
and fathers and it does not ensure that an inheritance goes to 
the nurturing parent. 
First, it is unfair to the father. A father must not only 
establish paternity to inherit through his child, but he must 
also "openly treat the child as his" and "not refuse to support 
the child". The mother on the other hand must do nothing. She 
is automatically entitled to inherit through the child. This is 
grossly unfair to the father who is thereby prevented from 
inheriting through his child merely on the basis of gender. 
Second, the subject statute does not ensure that only the 
"nurturing" parent be entitled to the child's inheritance. The 
subject statute allows the mother to inherit from her child 
regardless of what she has done. The mere fact she gave birth to 
the child entitles her to an inheritance through the child. 
Theoretically, a mother could abandon the child and take no 
active role in its nurturing or support and still not be 
prevented from taking an inheritance through the child. It is 
clear therefore, that the subject statute does not ensure that 
the "nurturing" parent will be the only one entitled to inherit 
through the child. 
The Respondent also suggests that the Court's holding in 
Caban was based upon the fact that the father had a "substantial 
relationship" with the child. It is interesting to note, 
however, that the Court in Caban said that a state's legitimate 
interest in withholding a father's right was proof of paternity. 
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See Caban, 441 U.S. at 393, footnote number 15. The Court also 
noted that the statute in question, much like the subject 
statute, "enabled some alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut off 
the paternal rights of the fathers". Caban, 441 U.S. at 394. 
The Court's holding in Caban therefore was actually based upon 
its finding that mothers and fathers are similarly situated and 
that the statute discriminated against fathers. 
The Respondent further relies upon Lehr v. Robertson, 
where a statute which discriminated upon the basis of gender was 
upheld by the United States Supreme Court. An analysis of the 
Court's opinion in Lehr indicates that it is simply another case 
which illustrates the importance of paternity. In Lehr, the 
Court refused to recognize a father's right in his child's 
adoption since paternity had not been established. Although the 
Court did address the fact that a substantial relationship with 
the child was important, it found that the father had not 
established his paternity and he should therefore be denied his 
rights in the adoption. 
By requiring the father, but not the mother, to do more 
than establish paternity, the subject statute falls short of 
serving any legitimate interest. Such an interest is necessary 
for a gender-based distinction to be upheld by the Courts. The 
subject statute favors mothers over fathers and it does not 
ensure that only a "nurturing" parent will inherit from his 
child. The subject statute therefore does not pass the 
intermediate level of scrutiny and should be declared 
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unconstitutional. 
Ill 
THE SUBJECT STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE SINCE THE 
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE IS OPEN TO MANY DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS 
AND ALLOWS JUDGES AND JURORS TO DETERMINE ITS MEANING WITHOUT ANY 
LEGALLY FIXED CRITERIA. 
As stated in the Brief of the Appellant, a statute which 
is "so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain 
as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free 
to decide without any legally fixed standards what is prohibited 
and what is not" fails to meet the requirements of the due 
process clause. (Brief of Appellant, page 17 (citing In re 
Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085.) The language of the subject statute which 
requires a father to have "openly treated the child as his own" 
and "not refused to support the child" is the type of vague and 
standardless statute referred to by the Court in In re Boyer. 
The Respondent claims that the language is not vague since 
the trial judge had no difficulty in interpreting it and since 
the terms used are of "common usage". (Brief of Respondent, page 
19) . Although these claims may be true, these factors are 
irrelevant in determining whether the statute is vague. Under In 
re Boyer the relevant criteria are: (1) Is the public uncertain 
as to what is prohibited?; and (2) Are judges and jurors free to 
determine its meaning without any legally fixed criteria? If the 
answer to both of these questions is yes, then a statute is 
unconstitutionally vague. 
In response to these criteria, it is evident that one in 
the Appellant's position would not know what to do in order to 
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inherit through his child. Is paying child support enough? Must 
he send cards? Should he spend time with the child? If so, how 
much time should be spent with the child? The statute leaves all 
these questions unanswered and one who is in the Appellant's 
position uncertain as to what is prohibited and what is required 
under the statute. 
In addition, judges and jurors have no legally fixed 
standards to guide them. In order to determine whether the 
requirements have been met, they are left to their own personal 
views. They are free, as was the trial court judge, to define 
what is required of one in the Appellant's position. One could 
be forced to give up his rights to an inheritance if his 
interpretation of "openly treating the chid as his own11 was 
different than the judge's interpretation. In this case, the 
Appellant did pay child support, but according to the trial court 
judge, that was not enough. Until the judge made his 
interpretation of the statute, the Appellant had no way of 
knowing what was expected of him. The subject statute is 
therefore vague and unclear and in violation of the due process 
clause. 
IV 
ALTHOUGH STATUTES SHOULD BE PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL, THE 
COURTS HAVE AN IMPERATIVE DUTY TO STRIKE DOWN LEGISLATION WHICH 
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court has said: "Although the Supreme 
Court has the duty to give great deference to legislative 
announcements and to uphold constitutionality when possible, it 
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is the court's equally imperative duty to declare a legislative 
enactment invalid if it transgresses the state constitution". 
White v. Fischer, 689 P.2d 102 (Wyo. 1984). 
The subject statute both discriminates against fathers and 
is vague. Although it is entitled to a presumption of validity, 
it is now clear that it is in violation of both the United States 
and the Utah Constitutions. This Court therefore has the 
imperative duty to strike those provisions of the subject statute 
which are unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-109(1)(b) discriminates against 
fathers on the basis of gender. This discrimination is in 
violation of the Equal Protection clauses of both the Utah and 
the United States Constitutions, since mothers and "properly 
adjudicated" fathers are similarly situated and entitled to 
similar treatment. The statute also fails to serve any 
"important government objective" and therefore cannot withstand 
judicial scrutiny. 
The requirements of the subject statute which are imposed 
upon fathers but not mothers are in violation of due process and 
unconstitutionally vague. These portions of the statute should 
therefore be stricken. 
Appellant, Michael Pessetto, respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the Judgment and Decree of Judge David E. Roth 
of the Trial Court and declare §75-2-109 of Utah Code Annotated 
unconstitutional. Appellant further requests that those portions 
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of the statute which provide dissimilar treatment of mothers and 
fathers be stricken with the result being that both mothers and 
fathers be treated equally and Appellant, as the properly 
adjudicated father, be allowed to inherit through his child. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^(n 0 day of ftagcnt, 1988. 
Is 
RANDALL L. SKEEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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